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IT TAKES TIME: THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS
OF GENDER QUOTA
Bram Wauters, Gert-Jan Put and Bart Maddens
We have estimated the changes in parties’ behaviour following the introduction of quota regulations in
Belgium. We expected to ﬁnd a curvilinear effect: shortly after the introduction, women candidates
would be worse off due to, amongst others, reluctance of the party elite to support women in the elec-
toral contest. But after some time, their situation would improve—we hypothesise—either because
parties become more convinced of women’s qualities or because of strategic considerations. Our
results do show an initial setback followed by a modest increase, but this increase takes longer than
we initially assumed.
Introduction
Worldwide, politicians devote increasing attention to the socio-demographic representa-
tiveness of political institutions. The under-representation in political institutions of speciﬁc
groups, women in particular, is increasingly considered a democratic problem (Phillips 1995).
To counter the lack of representativeness, many countries have undertaken action. At present,
over a hundred countries worldwide have adopted a form of quotas (Dahlerup 2007; Krook 2007).
The presence of women in parliaments has also been high on the research agenda for
several decades. Not surprisingly, considerable scholarly attention has been given to quota
regulations. One strand of research has focused on the effects of quotas. Increasingly, research-
ers are becoming convinced that to evaluate the effects of quotas, one should go beyond an
analysis of the number of elected women (Franceschet et al. 2012). In this article, we will adopt
such an approach by assessing whether quotas have provoked behavioural changes of party
elites in the election process. By looking at a number of indicators inﬂuenced by parties’
behaviour, we will evaluate whether parties1 have become more supportive of women candi-
dates. The indicators we use are women candidates’ seniority, campaign expenses, list position
and preferential votes. As we will demonstrate below, all these variables are at least partially
inﬂuenced by party elites. By comparing the values on these indicators before and after
quota regulations are introduced, we conduct a quasi-experimental analysis in which the pres-
ence of quota functions as an independent variable.
The focus is on candidates for the Belgian Senate elections in the Flemish region. In con-
trast to previous research (Murray 2010) that evaluates quotas by analysing the proﬁle and
activities of women parliamentarians, our study also includes candidates, enabling us to inves-
tigate party behaviour more fully.
We start with a brief overview of quota research and with a situation of our approach. We
then deal more extensively with the indicators of parties’ behaviour. Next, we sketch the
Belgian institutional context. Then, we explain our methodology and discuss our results.
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Quota Research
Quota regulations have been studied from different angles: the classiﬁcation of various
measures that are labelled quotas (e.g., Dahlerup 2007; Norris 2004) and the adoption process
of quotas (e.g., Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Krook 2006) have been two major foci of scho-
larly attention in this perspective.
Another important line of research has examined the implementation and the effects of
quotas. Most notably, the effect on the number of parliamentary seats for women and the inter-
vening variables that play a role here (e.g., AQ1
¶
Caul 2001; Krook 2007; Murray et al. 2012; Tremblay
2008), and the effect on the substantive representation of women’s interests (e.g., Franceschet
and Piscopo 2008; Zetterberg 2008) has attracted a lot of research attention.
The implementation of quotas could, however, have other effects as well. The neo-insti-
tutionalist approach states that institutions constrain and stimulate particular social behaviour
(Peters 2005). ‘Institutions’ broadly conceived include all kinds of material and immaterial social
constructions, such as formal rules and informal norms. Quota regulations can be seen as such
a (rather formal) institution which produces (or changes) particular social behaviour. Here, it is
our aim to assess the effects of quotas on the behaviour of party elites. These are crucial actors,
as they play a dominant role in the selection and recruitment process, and because it has been
shown that they often have a negative impact on women’s representation (for instance by
complying with quota laws only in a minimal way) (Murray 2010). Apart from parties, other
actors such as the electorate, the family of a politician and women politicians themselves
(Bhavnani 2009) are relevant for determining the chance to become elected. We will not con-
sider these additional actors in this article.
We operationalise party elite behaviour by looking at indicators that are strongly inﬂu-
enced by party elites (see below): list position, seniority, campaign expenses and preferential
votes. Changes in these indicators can result from strategic considerations or from real
changes in the views of party elites. These latter changes could be related to the so-called sym-
bolic dimension of representation, which refers to the view on politics as a ‘male’ domain (Fran-
ceschet et al. 2012; Meier 2008). By disconnecting the exclusive link between politics and men,
quotas can convince women that a political career could be an option for them. At the same
time, the change in gendered ideas about political participation can also improve the views on
women politicians held by a number of actors (including party elites). We should note,
however, that in this article we only look at the behaviour of party elites (and the results of
this behaviour), leaving aside whether this stems from a real change in the minds of party
selectorates or is only prompted by strategic considerations.
Expectations
Based on previous research and theories, we do have clear expectations about the evol-
ution in the indicators. We expect to ﬁnd a curvilinear effect: ﬁrst a slight decrease (or stability
at best) in the indicators, afterwards an increase.
In a ﬁrst phase, the scores on the indicators will remain stable or will even decrease.
Three theoretical explanations support this expectation. First, male and female politicians
differ in their acceptance and perception of quota regulations (Meier 2008). These different
attitudes can be attributed to differences in their explanations of women’s under-represen-
tation. In men’s opinions, women’s under-representation is due to factors on the individual
level (lack of political interest, etc.) and hence women themselves should undertake action
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in order to improve their situation. Women, on the contrary, are convinced that their
disadvantaged position can be explained by structural factors, which can only be overcome
by structural measures, such as quotas. Male MPs are often forced to vote in favour of
quota legislation (by women’s organisations, due to party discipline, etc.), but often only
comply in a minimal way with this legislation afterwards (Bacchi 2006; Franceschet
et al. 2012).
Second, one can point to a ‘distribution effect’ (Niven 1998). Given the historic and
current absence of women from the political sphere (in parliament as well as in parties),
men are thought to be more likely to succeed in politics. On top of that, critics fear that the
requirement to nominate more women candidates will lead to the election of women that
are not up to the job. Therefore, party elites are not likely to grant a good position to
women nor to give them much support in elections.
Third, there is an ‘outgroup effect’ (Niven 1998; Tremblay and Pelletier 2001). Party elites
responsible for selection of candidates, for distributing campaign budgets, etc., are predomi-
nantly male. They see women as an outgroup and assess individual women candidates by
using stereotypes, leading them to judge women candidates as less politically capable. Male
candidates belonging to the ‘ingroup’ because of the similarity to the party elite (‘old boys
network’), are more easily judged as politically capable.
In a second phase, however, we expect an improvement in the indicators. The distri-
bution effect will change: after running some elections using quotas, parties should arguably
have become used to prominent women politicians and this should have a favourable effect
on the selection of women and on the party support they enjoy. On top of that, if voters
become more supportive of women politicians, it could be a strategic consideration to put
(more) women candidates (in prominent positions) on the list (Bhavnani 2009). Finally, the ‘out-
group’ effect will disappear as women will increasingly become part of the party elite that
decides on the position and the support that women are granted. The cooptation of
women to the party elite (either replacing or complementing male politicians) could further
the chances of women candidates. This argument states that party elite’s behaviour will
change because of the change in its composition.
In sum, we expect to ﬁnd a curvilinear effect of quotas: in a ﬁrst stage, the candidates’
proﬁles will reﬂect the hesitant or even averse opinions of party elites, but in the long run
quotas are likely to produce women candidates that are equally supported as men. Note
that our expectations differ from Bhavnani’s (2009) ﬁndings based on the analysis of a
system of reserved seats for women in Mumbai (India). He found an immediate effect on
the chance for women to become elected at the next elections. A system of reserved seats
differs, however, from a quota system in two crucial aspects: in a system of reserved seats,
women do not have to compete with male candidates and there are formal guarantees for
a high number of female incumbents at the next elections. As competition between male
and female candidates often ends at the expense of the latter and as incumbency is a
crucial factor for the electoral fortunes of candidates (Villodres 2003), the risk to lose seats
for a party when presenting female candidates is considerably higher in a quota system. There-
fore, we expect the evolution for women to go slower (and even with an initial backlash) in
quota systems.
As the ideological position of parties often impacts on their propensity to grant chances
to women (Caul 1999), we will also analyse whether there are differences between parties in
the indicators. We will investigate, more in particular, whether leftist parties (greens and social-
ists) are more supportive for women politicians than rightist parties.2
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The Operationalisation of Parties’ Behaviour
The impact of quotas on the behaviour of parties towards women in politics will be
measured by analysing four indicators that are inﬂuenced by leading party actors. We are
fully aware that other actors (electorate, media, etc.) could inﬂuence (some of) these variables,
but they fall outside the scope of this study. Where possible, the effect of parties will be singled
out in the empirical analysis (e.g., for campaign expenses). We will ﬁrst show how parties inﬂu-
ence the indicators used in the analysis.
List Position
A candidate’s position on the party list is an important factor in list PR systems. Previous
research has shown that candidates at the top of the list automatically draw more votes due to
the ‘Ballot Position Effect’ (Geys and Heyndels 2003; Lutz 2010; Maddens et al. 2006), and
thanks to the transfer of list votes in ﬂexible-list PR systems, they stand a greater chance of
being elected.
List positions are determined by party elites, who continue to be the main decision-
makers, despite recent tendencies to give the rank and ﬁle a greater say in the composition
of candidate lists (Bille 2001). Male-dominated party elites are often reluctant to lose their
power and while they agree to introduce quota regulations, in practice they often undermine
these regulations by preferring to pay a penalty instead of complying with the law (if possible)
and by relegating women to lower positions on the party list or to more challenging (less safe)
districts than men (Dahlerup 2007; Murray et al. 2012). We expect that this will change over time.
Seniority
Experience is important in the electoral process, as it helps candidates to obtain a good
position on the list and a high number of votes (Schwindt-Bayer 2005). It also matters once
candidates become elected. Experience allows parliamentarians to build up specialised exper-
tise and relevant networks, which enables them to challenge the omnipotence of the govern-
ment and to inﬂuence policy decisions (Beckwith 2007).
Initially, women will be less experienced since they have mainly been excluded from
politics before quotas were introduced. Afterwards, there is the potential to create a pool of
established and experienced women politicians. The party elite (as gatekeeper of the candi-
date lists) plays a crucial role in realising or hindering the gradual creation of a female political
elite. A recent study has in this respect revealed that women MPs are more often deselected by
the party than men (Vanlangenakker et al. forthcoming AQ2).
Campaign Expenses
The difference in campaign expenses between men and women can be explained both
at the level of individual candidates (lack of ambition, lower self-esteem, etc.; e.g., Frederick
2007) and at the party level. The amount which a candidate is allowed to invest in the cam-
paign is to a large extent determined by the party. In Belgium, political parties may, for
instance, select a limited number of candidates who are allowed to spend a much larger
amount than the regular candidates (see below). If predominantly male candidates are
allowed to spend this maximum, the average expenditures of women will be lower which
involves a competitive disadvantage.
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Preferential Votes
Preferential votes for women in PR systems are important, as the number of preferential
votes has a partial but substantial impact on the actual election and on future career prospects
of politicians. At ﬁrst glance, this indicator seems to reﬂect the general public’s attitude towards
women. But reality appears to be more complex: some recent studies (Murray et al. 2012;
Wauters et al. 2010) have revealed that a lower number of preferential votes for women can
be primarily attributed to systemic bias (by the party) rather than to voter bias. In other
words, women obtain fewer voters due to inadequate support from their party. Earlier research
has shown that once elements (mainly) controlled by the party such as list position, campaign
expenses and media attention are included in the analysis, voters no longer discriminate
against women casting a vote (Wauters et al. 2010). This proves that this variable, which is at
ﬁrst sight clearly linked to individual voter behaviour, is in fact strongly inﬂuenced by the party.
Electoral and Quota Systems in Belgium
Our analysis will concern Belgium, a textbook example of a society where democratically
elected institutions aspire to reﬂect diversity, with a guaranteed representation of language
groups, quota regulations for women, etc. (Meier 2000). Before starting the analysis, we will
ﬁrst provide some information on the Belgian electoral system and quota provisions.
In Belgium’s so-called ‘ﬂexible-list system’, voters can either vote for a party list or for one
or more candidates (on a single party list). Candidates receiving sufﬁcient preferential votes to
pass the election threshold are automatically elected. The other candidates can make use of
the list votes in order to reach this threshold. These list votes are distributed to the candidates
according to their list position, offering a substantial advantage to candidates at the top of the
list. However, in recent elections, more and more low-ranked candidates have managed to win
more votes than higher-ranked candidates and got elected. This is due to the growing number
of voters casting a preferential vote instead of a party-list vote and to a recent electoral reform
halving the impact of party-list votes on the allocation of seats ( AQ3Andre´ et al. 2012).
In 1994, a ﬁrst quota law, stating that no more than two-thirds of the candidates on a list
could be of the same sex, was introduced. In 2002, this was changed into the requirement that
electoral lists should include an equal number of men and women. In addition, one of the two
top (often safe, electable) positions on the list must be reserved for a woman. As a transitional
measure for the 2003 election, only one of the three highest positions was reserved for a
woman. Candidate quotas, however, only affect the composition of the candidate lists, not
the actual election. Nevertheless, the quota legislation led to a substantial increase in
women MPs. The percentage of women senators for instance rose from 12% in 1991 to 24%
in 1995 and 38% in 2003. After a drop in 2007 (30%), a new high score could be noted in
2010 (43%) (Celis and Meier 2006; IGVM 2010).
In sum, Belgium combines both for the ballot structure and for the quota regulations a
mix of features: both list and preferential votes and both modest and more strict quota regu-
lations are used. As the Belgian situation presents a broad range of possible situations, our ﬁnd-
ings speak to a variety of contextual features, expanding the generalisability of our ﬁndings.
Methodology and Research Questions
In countries with legislative quotas, the most appropriate method to assess the effect of
quotas on parties’ behaviour is to compare this behaviour before and after the introduction of
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quota regulations (Francheschet et al. 2012).3 As such, a sort of quasi-experiment could be set
up in which the effect of the presence (or change) in gender quota functions as independent
variable.
We will analyse the Belgian Senate elections from 1995 until 2010. Ideally, we should
have included 1991 and perhaps also even 1987 in the analysis as elections without quota.
The electoral districts (both for the House and for the Senate) were, however, drastically
reformed after the 1991 elections, which would have rendered a comparison between these
elections and the elections under scrutiny here very complex and difﬁcult.4 Analysing the
House elections (instead of the Senate elections) would make the analysis even more
complex, since electoral districts for these elections were reformed a second time in 2003.
Belgian Senate elections are held in region-wide electoral districts that have remained
unchanged for the last ﬁve elections (1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2010). Hence, we have
two elections with a moderate quota system (1995 and 1999 elections, when no more than
two-thirds of the candidates on a list could be of the same sex) and three elections with stricter
quota regulations (2003, 2007 and 2010, when the lists were required to have an equal number
of candidates of each sex). Senate elections have a special status in Belgium: despite the fact
that the Senate’s powers are more limited than that of the House, the possibility to be on a
candidate list covering the territory of a whole region has turned the Senate elections into a
battleground where party leaders and government ministers compete with each other to
become the most popular candidate (Deschouwer 2009). Apart from these heads of list,
Senate candidates on lower-ranked positions include (former) ministers, leaders of the parlia-
mentary party and other party ﬁgures known all over the Flemish region (instead of only in
their own electoral district). In addition, campaign expenses of Senate candidates are on
average higher than those of House candidates (Wauters et al. 2010), indicating that Senate
elections are highly competitive (both between and within parties). In sum, Belgian Senate
elections are thus clearly not second-order elections. If the curvilinear effect occurs even in
these high-proﬁle elections, then it seems plausible that it will also appear in elections in
which less prominent party ﬁgures run for ofﬁce.
We expect the introduction of each quota regulation to result in initial setbacks in the
indicators at issue here, followed by an increase. We also expect a smaller drop in 2003 (i.e.,
when a more strict quota regulation was introduced) than in 1995 because by then parties
were already used to the principle of quotas (which were ﬁrst used in the 1995 elections).
Given the huge number of data to be collected, we decided to limit the analysis to
parties of only one region, i.e., Flanders,5 which is the largest Belgian region. Flemish parties
compete with each other in the Dutch(-speaking) electoral constituency,6 in which 25 out of
40 directly elected seats are distributed. Moreover, the parties, the party system and the elec-
toral context in the other Belgian regions differ, which would make the analysis more compli-
cated. Usually, analyses of the effects of quotas focus on members of parliament (see, e.g.,
Murray 2010), but in order to assess changes in the recruitment, selection and election
process we decided to include also candidates in our analysis.
The research population (N¼887) consists of all candidates, both effective and substitute
candidates.7 The dataset contains information about sex, list position, campaign expenditures
and preferential votes of all candidates for the ﬁve Flemish parties participating in the last ﬁve
consecutive Belgian Senate elections (1995, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2010). These parties are the
Christian-democratic party CD&V (previously CVP), the social-democratic party SP.A (previously
SP), the liberal party OpenVLD (previously VLD), the green party Groen! (previously Agalev) and
the extreme right party Vlaams Belang (previously Vlaams Blok).
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deterioration in the position of women candidates, but this tendency is reversed after a few elec-
tions. The pattern of a decrease of the position of women in 1999 is apparent inmost parties, with
the exception of the ecologists and the liberal-democrats (where women already had a good
average list position in 1995). The increase in 2010 is less consistent across the various parties.
Candidate Seniority
We expect an inﬂux of new women candidates in the ﬁrst elections after the adoption of
quota regulations (1999 and 2003). The number of newly recruited women candidates should
decrease once selectors gain conﬁdence in the political role of women and in the creation of a
female political elite.
Figure 2 shows the percentage of candidates that have been a candidate before (either
nominated for one of the elections to the House, the Senate, the regional parliaments or the
European Parliament since 1987). The percentage of women candidates with prior electoral
experience remained constant in 1999 (48.4%) and rose to 60.8% in 2003, before decreasing
again to 53.8% in 2007. It is only in 2010 that a marked increase in experienced women can-
didates could be noted (81.0%) and that the percentage of women with prior electoral experi-
ence is higher than the percentage of men. This is the case for every party: the percentage of
experienced candidates amongst women is substantially higher in 2010 than in 1995, and in
most cases even higher than the percentage amongst men.
If we subtract the percentage of experienced male candidates from the percentage of
experienced female candidates, we ﬁnd a curvilinear effect, but one that develops rather
slowly. New quota regulations cause an inﬂux of new candidates in the ﬁrst few elections,
which levels off afterwards. A X2 test conﬁrms that in 1999 and 2007 the number of can-
didates with previous experience is signiﬁcantly lower amongst men than amongst
women.11 For the other elections, this difference is not signiﬁcant. Seniority can also be
measured on the basis of incumbency, i.e., whether or not a candidate was a member
of parliament (at the federal, regional or European level) or a minister during the preceding
legislature (Figure 3). In 1999, the percentage of incumbents on the candidate lists
FIGURE 2
Percentage of established candidates (previously candidate for either House, Senate,
European or Flemish Parliament since 1987) (N¼887)
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increased amongst both men and women, to 24.7% and 18.5%, respectively. Subsequently,
it remained constant amongst the female candidates, but continued to increase (to about
38%) amongst the male candidates. In 2007, this ‘stagnation’ amongst women candidates
was obviously related to the unexpected high inﬂow of new (and hence by deﬁnition non-
incumbent) women candidates. In 2003 and 2007, the difference in the percentage of
incumbents amongst men and women is statistically signiﬁcant, in 1995, it is borderline
signiﬁcant.12
In 2010, the percentage of incumbent women again remained constant, but due to a
decline in male incumbents, the difference between men and women became less marked
and no longer signiﬁcant. To a certain extent, this difference exhibits a curvilinear
pattern, although we should note that the 2010 difference is still larger than that observed
in 1999.
When split up according to party the data show a more erratic pattern, but in all parties
except one (the liberal-democrats) the percentage of incumbents amongst women candidates
is substantially higher in 2010 than in 1995.
Campaign Expenses
As explained above, a distinction has to be made between ‘regular’ candidates
subject to lower spending limits (typically 10,000 Euro) and candidates granted a substan-
tially higher spending limit (of about 80,000 Euro). The number of these latter candidates
(the so-called maximum expenditure candidates) equals the number of seats obtained at
the previous election plus one. If a party obtained two seats, for instance, then the two can-
didates at the top of the list as well as one candidate chosen by the party are entitled to
FIGURE 3
Percentage incumbent candidates (as MP or minister) (N¼887)
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spend the maximum amount. Thus, whether or not a candidate may spend this maximum
amount is partly determined by the place on the list and partly by the party (which may
freely pick one additional candidate). Parties thus play a crucial role as they determine
both the order of the candidate list and the extra candidate. It is to be expected that
the quota rules with regard to top positions will lead to an increase in the percentage
of women entitled to spend the maximum amount. This was indeed the case in 1999,
when the percentage of women amongst the candidates with the highest spending cap
increased substantially from 27.5% (in 1995) to 43.2% (in 1999). But in the subsequent elec-
tions, this percentage declined to 37.5% in 2003 and 31% in 2007, increasing again to
38.5% in 2010 (Figure 4). An X2 test shows that the under-representation of women
amongst the candidates allowed to spend the maximum amount is statistically signiﬁcant
in 2007 and borderline signiﬁcant in 2003.13 For the other elections, this relationship is
not signiﬁcant.
The percentage of candidates with the highest spending cap amongst women also
declined: in 1995, 22.9% of the (limited) number of women candidates was allowed to
spend the maximum amount. This percentage increased slightly to 24.6% in 1999 to decline
substantially to 15.5% in 2003 and to 9.8% in 2007 and 10.5% in 2010.
In 2003 and 2007 the difference between men and women peaks at about 10 percen-
tage points, to decrease to 5.7 percentage points in 2010.
This difference is reﬂected in the development of the mean campaign expenses of
men and women (see Figure 5).14 In 1995, the average expenses of male (18,908 Euro)
and female (18,380 Euro) candidates were more or less comparable, but from 1999
onwards the average expenses of women candidates started to decrease, resulting in a
difference of 7179 Euro in 2003. The somewhat smaller differences in 2007 (6631 Euro)
and in 2010 (3819 Euro) are due to sharp decreases in male candidates’ average expenses.
These differences between men and women with regard to spending are statistically
FIGURE 4
Percentage of men candidates allowed to spend maximum amount, percentage of women
candidates allowed to spend maximum amount, and difference between them (N¼887)
10 BRAM WAUTERS ET AL.
425
430
435
440
445
450
455
460
465
470
signiﬁcant for 2003 and 2007, but no longer for 2010.15 This pattern is also apparent in most
parties: the gap between men and women with regard to expenses initially widens but
decreases slightly in 2010. This pattern is not due to the expenses incurred by the
‘regular’ candidates: among these candidates, the difference between men and women dis-
appeared from 2003 onwards (due to a sharp increase in the expenses of women candidates
in 2003) ( AQ5not shown in ﬁgure).
As for the candidates with the highest spending cap, women spent more than men in
1995.16 In 1999, their campaign expenditure decreased sharply, resulting in a difference
with men of 11,562 Euro. But in 2007, it increased substantially, thus narrowing the gap
with the men’s average expenditure to 7308 Euro. Although the campaign expenditures of
women candidates allowed to spend the maximum amount dropped slightly in 2010, the
gap with men shrank to 4270 Euro (as the expenditures of the men entitled to spend the
maximum allowed had fallen more sharply).17 Thus, the trend observed amongst women can-
didates with the highest spending cap is more or less in line with the expected curvilinear
pattern, although the expense level is not yet as high as in 1995.
In sum, the overall pattern of a widening gap between male and female campaign
expenditures in 2003 and 2007 is due both to the lower spending amongst the women
allowed to spend the maximum amount and to the fact that there were relatively fewer
women than men allowed to spend this maximum. The convergence observed in
male and female expenditures in 2010 can be attributed to an increase of both of these
factors.
Preferential Votes
Women candidates obtain fewer preferential votes than men (see Figure 6). The gender
gap with regard to preferential votes widened in 1999 and 2003. In 2003 this difference is stat-
istically signiﬁcant: a male candidate on average obtained 1.16% of the total number of valid
votes in the constituency, against 0.53% for a woman candidate.18 However, this divergence
FIGURE 5
Average campaign expenses per candidate: all candidates (N¼887)
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was not due to a loss of preferential votes amongst women (there was actually a slight
increase) but to the much stronger increase amongst men. In 2007, the gender gap narrowed
as the percentage of male candidates decreased while that of women increased. In 2010, this
gap had almost completely disappeared (and is no longer signiﬁcant) as men faced a sharp fall
in preferential votes (to 0.68%), while preferential votes for women decreased only slightly (to
0.54%).19
This pattern recurs in almost every separate party (except for the green party, Groen,
where women always obtain more preferential votes): the male lead with regard to preference
votes increases from 1999 onwards, to decrease (and in the case of the Christian-democrats
even to disappear) in 2010.
However, this picture is somewhat blurred by ﬂuctuations in the overall number of pre-
ferential votes cast ( AQ4Andre´ et al. 2012). In order to control for these ﬂuctuations, we calculated
the number of preferential votes for women candidates as a percentage of all preferential
votes cast (Figure 7). As this percentage of votes evidently correlates with the percentage of
female candidates on the list, we also calculated the difference between these two percen-
tages. Both the percentages of votes and of candidates increase over time, though not to
the same extent. In 1995, the 31.2% of women candidates obtained 24.1% of all preferential
votes cast, resulting in a difference of 7.1%. In 1999, the percentage of women candidates
rose, but the percentage of preferential votes rose to a lower extent. Consequently, the differ-
ence between these two percentages increased to 12.4%. In 2003, when women candidates
accounted for 50% as a result of the more stringent quota laws, this gap grew even wider
to 18.8%. In 2007, female candidates managed to narrow the gap somewhat to 12.6%. In
2010, 49% women candidates received 42.9% of all preferential votes, resulting in an even
smaller difference of 6.1%.
This pattern generally conforms to our expectations. The initial sharp increase in prefer-
ential votes for men is probably due to the fact that, after the less popular male candidates
FIGURE 6
Average number of preferential votes (as a percentage of the total number of valid votes in
the constituency) (N¼887)
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were replaced by women candidates (in order to comply with the quota regulations), the
remaining men on the list tended to be more popular than the neophyte women. But by
2007, these new candidates seem to be considered by the party as politically ‘mature’, received
more support and were consequently able to attract a larger share of preferential votes,
although a (small) gap with men remained.
The fact that women candidates obtain fewer preferential votes than men and that
this gap widened in 1999 and 2003 is obviously related to the other variables discussed
above (Wauters et al. 2010). The number of preferential votes is primarily determined by
a candidate’s position on the list. Thus, the lower a female candidate’s rank on the list,
the fewer preferential votes she will receive. We also know that campaign ﬁnance has a
signiﬁcant effect on the number of preferential votes (Wauters et al. 2010). Thus, women
are electorally sanctioned because their campaign expenses are lower, which, as shown
above, is partially due to the fact that they are less often selected as candidates allowed
to spend the maximum allowed.
Conclusions
In this article, we have evaluated the effects of quotas on parties’ behaviour towards
women politicians. We have estimated the changes in the behaviour of party elites by
looking at the evolution in list position, campaign expenses, candidate seniority and the
number of preferential votes after the introduction of gender quotas. All these variables are
to a large extent inﬂuenced by party elites. The focus was on the Belgian Senate elections,
which are highly competitive and tend to attract high-proﬁle candidates.
We expected to ﬁnd a curvilinear effect. Shortly after the introduction of quotas, women
would be worse off due to the difﬁculties faced by (male) party elites in coping with the new
regulations and by implicit assumptions about what constitutes a good candidate. After some
time, this negative effect would disappear—we hypothesised—because parties would
FIGURE 7
Percentage of preferential votes for women candidates and percentage women candidates
on the lists (N¼887)
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become accustomed to women taking prominent positions in politics, because women are
increasingly included in party elite networks and because of strategic considerations.
The results of our analysis do indeed show in general an initial setback followed by a
modest increase in the indicators. This pattern could mostly be found for all parties: the
ideological position of parties (left–right) does not appear to play a large role in this
respect.
It remains unclear, however, whether this increase is due to a change in party elites’ atti-
tudes or to strategic considerations. Further research focused on candidate selectorates could
shed more light on this discussion. Bhavnani’s (2009) analysis suggests that party elites tend to
become more supportive for successful women candidates only, which implies that strategic
considerations prevail.
Our results show further that ‘in the long run’ takes a rather long time (and several
elections). It is often not in the ﬁrst nor in the second elections but only in the third elec-
tions after the introduction of gender quotas that a rise in our indicators can be noted. On
top of that, the ﬁnal score obtained by women candidates for, e.g., list position and cam-
paign expenses, is still lower than their initial level. These scores also remain well below the
scores of men. The reluctance among party elites to support women in the electoral process
appears to be stronger than expected and seriously impedes an evolution towards more
equal representation. This reluctance becomes apparent, for instance, from the limited
number of women designated as privileged candidates allowed to spend a higher
amount of money on their campaign.
This proves that quota systems will continue to be necessary for a while in order to
ensure greater political participation of women. This is at odds with Bhavnani’s (2009)
ﬁndings: in a system with reserved seats, he found that even when this provision was
lifted, the position of female candidates continued to be improved at the next elections.
Since the quota system discussed in this article does allow for competition between male
and female candidates and does not formally guarantee the creation of a pool of female
incumbents, the risk to lose seats due to quota regulations is higher for parties. Therefore,
it takes longer to really improve women’s position in electoral contests than in a system
with reserved seats. But the positive trend observed encourages the hope that one day
quotas will become superﬂuous as parties will then support men and women equally.
NOTES
1. Parties and party elites are used interchangeably here. We look at parties, but parties’ behav-
iour is to a large extent determined by party elites.
2. We should be cautious, however, as the number of observations becomes small when split-
ting up the analysis on party basis.
3. An alternative approach could be a comparison of the situation before and after quota regu-
lations were withdrawn (e.g., Bhavnani 2009).
4. As such, we try to control for the institutional context (electoral system) over the period
under investigation. Apart from this institutional context, there are other factors that
could possibly have affected parties’ behaviour, such as international conferences, pressure
from women’s movements, etc. It is not possible to control for all these factors. Conse-
quently, one should be aware that the effects could not solely be attributed to quota regu-
lations alone, but that other factors can also play a (minor) role.
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5. Parties are organised on the regional level. There are Flemish parties and French-speaking
parties in Belgium.
6. For the Senate, there are two constituencies (the Dutch(-speaking) and the French(-speak-
ing) constituency) and three electoral disticts (Flanders, Wallonia and the bilingual district
Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde). The Dutch(-speaking) constituency consists of the Flemish elec-
toral district and the votes for Flemish parties in the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde district (in
which Flemish parties have to compete with French-speaking parties). Seats are distributed
on the level of the constituency.
7. In 1995 and 1999, there were 25 effective and six substitute candidates per list. In 2003, 2007
and 2010 the number of substitute candidates increased to 14. In very exceptional cases, a
politician runs both as effective and substitute candidate. In that case, only the position as
effective candidate was taken into account.
8. Taking into account that the analysis is not based on a sample but on the entire population
of candidates, there is no need to check whether the obtained differences or trends are stat-
istically signiﬁcant.
9. In order to obtain a graph comparable to the other graphs (a positive slope always means
an improvement for women), we coded this variable by the negative value of the actual list
position. Someone at the head of the list has a value of -1, the second on the list has -2,
and so on.
10. Based on the results of an analysis of variance with the position on the list as dependent
variable and election year as class variable, for the women candidates.
11. For 1999 (X2¼6.95, p¼0.0084) and for 2007 (X2¼8.16, p¼0.0043)
12. For 2003 (X2¼9.1608, p¼0.0025) and 2007 (X2¼6.6356, p¼0.01), the difference is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, for 1995 (X2¼3.2009, p¼0.0736) it is borderline signiﬁcant.
13. For 2007 (X2¼4.02, p¼0.045) and for 2003 (X2¼3.15, p¼0.076).
14. All amounts are calculated in Euros and in prices of June 2010 so as to control for inﬂation
and to make them comparable over time.
15. Based on the results of an analysis of variance with the expenditures as dependent variable
and gender as class variable, separately for each election year. 2003: F¼5.31, p¼0.0223;
2007: F¼4.50, p¼0.0352.
16. There is a strong relationship between being allowed to spend the maximum amount and
actually obtaining a seat. Hence, the results are very similar if we limit the analysis of the
campaign expenses to the subset of (110) winning candidates. In 1995, the female
winning candidates spent more than the male winning candidates, but this difference
was reversed in 1999 and decreased in 2010.
17. An analysis of variance shows that these differences are not statistically signiﬁcant, but this is
also due to the low N.
18. An analysis of variance (with the relative number of preferential votes as dependent variable
and gender as class variable, for each election separately) shows that the difference between
men and women is statistically signiﬁcant in 2003 (F¼6.96, p¼0.009) and borderline signiﬁ-
cant in 2007 (F¼2.69, p¼0.1024).
19. The results are similar for the subsets of the 110 winning candidates, who obtained a seat,
and the 777 candidates who did not. For both groups, the gender gap increases in 2003, but
starts to decrease from 2007 onwards and almost disappears in 2010. We also obtain similar
results for these two subsets when we calculate the share of the preference votes obtained
by the candidates (see below).
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